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Abstract. Dolev and Yao (1983) developed an elegant characterization f two-party cascade 
protocols that are secure. Pan (1985) extended their result o the case of p-party cascade protocols. 
Here we show that there is no such simple characterization of name-stamp protocols that are secure. 
1. Introduction 
Public key encryption as used in network communication has been investigated 
extensively. The main advantage of the techniques developed in this area is the 
potential for secure communication. However, while public key systems are often 
effective in preventing a passive saboteur from deciphering an intercepted message, 
protocols must be designed to be secure when dealing with saboteurs who can 
impersonate users or send copies of intercepted messages. Dolev and Yao [4] have 
shown how informal arguments about protocols can lead to erroneous conclusions, 
and they have developed a formal model of two-party cascade protocols intended 
to be used for the exchange of plaintext messages. In terms of this model, they have 
developed an elegant characterization f secure protocols, a characterization with 
conditions that can be checked by inspection. 
Dolev and Yao also developed a formal model of two-party name-stamp protocols. 
They showed that the questions of whether a given name-stamp protocol is secure 
is decidable in polynomial time (a faster algorithm is now known [3]). However, 
Dolev and Yao did not develop a Characterization f secure name-stamp protocols. 
The purpose of the present note is to show that no such characterization exists. We 
define the notion of a 'k-characterization f-security' in terms of the-ifidividual 
operator words that specify the protocol and show that there is no k/> 1 such that 
there exists a k-characterization f security for two-party name-stamp protocols. 
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We assume the reader to be familiar with the paper by Dolev and Yao [4] and 
so, we do not repeat all of the motivation, etc., for the models developed there. 
However, we do repeat enough definitions from [4] in order that this paper be 
technically self-contained. 
2. Protocols 
Consider a set F of functions and a set A of symbols such that each function in 
F has the free monoid A* on za as domain and co-domain. The set F consists of 
several types of functions: 
(a) For each user X, there is an encryption function Ex and a decryption function 
Dx. 
(b) Only finitely many users are assumed so that one can encode the names of 
the users as strings in A* that have length m for some fixed m>0.  For any we A*, 
if Iwl m, then let w = head(w)tail(w) where [tail(w)] = m. For each user X, there 
is a name-appending function ix where, for any w ~ A*, ix(W) = wX (we use X for 
the code of  X) ,  and there is a name-matching function 
J'head(w) if tail(w) = X, 
dx(w) I 
Lundefined otherwise. 




Let E ={Ex IX  is a user}, D={DxIX  is a user}, I={ ix lX  is a user}, and 
J = {dx IX is a user}. For any user Z, let Fz = {Dz} w E u I u J w {d}. Thus, the set 
F is E w D w I u J w {d}. One important assumption is that for two different users 
X and Y, the set {Ex, Dx, ix, dx, Ey, Dy, iy, dy, d} consists of nine different func- 
tions. 
The set T of  cancellation rules on F is the set of relations described in (a)-(c) below: 
(a) for every user X, Dx composed with Ex is the identity function 1 on A*; 
(b) for every user X, Ex composed with Dx is 1; 
(c) for every user X, dx composed with ix is 1 and d composed with ix is 1. 
Since A* is the domain and co-domain of every function in F, arbitrary composi- 
tions of functions from F are well defined. Another important assumption is that 
there is no relation on the composition of functions from F except hose that result 
from appl ication of the cancellation rules plus the normal associativity of composi- 
tion and the properties of the identity function. We denote the set of all finite 
compositions of functions in F by F*. 
For any y ~ F*, let It(y) denote the set of functions from F that occur in 3/. 
Define a binary relation ~ on F* as follows: for every a,/3 ~ F* and every user X, 
aDxEx/3 ~ aft, otExDx/3 ~ or~3, adxix/3 ~ a/3, and adixfl ~ a/3. Denote the transitive 
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reflexive closure of -> by --> *; the relation --> * is called the reduction relation. A 
word 3, ~ F*  is irreducible if there is no 8 such that 3, -> 8. For this note it is important 
to notice that the set T of cancellation rules is such that for every 3, e F*  there is 
a unique irreducible ~ such that 3, -> * ~. Additional properties of sets of cancellation 
rules are developed by the present authors in [1]. 
Notice that there are only functions in (Du  E)* that have two-sided inverses. 
The functions in (D  u E u I )*  have left inverses and the functions in (D  u E w J u 
{d})* have right inverses. 
If  3, ~ (D u E w I)*,  then let 3,-1 be a string of minimum length such that 3,-13, = 1. 
Notice that if lt(3,) c~ I ~ 0, then 3,-1 is not unique. I f  3, s (D  u E u J u {d})* ,  then 
let 3-1 be a string of minimum length such that 3,3,-1 = 1. In this case, if 3, contains 
an occurrence of  d, then 3,-1 is not unique. 
Now we can give a formal definition of name-stamp rotocols. 
A two-party name-stamp protocol P is specified by a sequence of finite strings 
t~i~{Zl, Z3, Z4,. . . ,z9}*, l<~i<~t, 
~j~{z2, z3, z l , . . . , z9}*,  l<-j<~t ',
where t '=  t or t' = t - 1. For each pair of distinct users X, II, let o~i(X, Y),/3j(X, Y) 
respectively denote the strings 6i,/3j under the substitution 
zl ~ Dx, z4 ~ Ey ,  Z 7 ~-> dx, 
z2 ~ Dr, z5 ~-> ix, z8 ~-> dr, 
z3 ~ Ex, Z 6 ~ iy, Z 9 ~ d. 
It is assumed that, for every X, II, every ai(X, Y) and flj(X, Y) are irreducible. 
For two users X and Y, let N~(X, Y) = al(X, Y), N2(X, Y) = ~I(X, Y)N~(X, Y), 
N3(X, Y)= ac2(X, Y)N2(X, Y) , . . . ,  N2,(X, Y)=f l , (X ,  Y)N2,_~(X, Y), N2,+,(X, Y) 
= a~+~(X, Y)N2~(X, Y), . . . .  In addition, we require that P be such that no N~(X, Y) 
contains any occurrence of a symbol in J u {d}. 
When user X wishes to initiate an exchange with user Y in order to transmit 
plaintext message M, then the sequence of messages exchanged is N~(X, Y ) (M) ,  
N2(X, Y ) (M) , . . . ,  N,+c(X, Y ) (M) ,  where X and Y alternately send messages with 
X beginning the sequence. 
Now we turn to the problem of security. We use the definition of Dolev and Yao 
[4, Definition 7, p. 203]. 
Let P = {¢~,/3j} be a two-party name-stamp rotocol. Suppose that for any three 
users X, Y, Z there exist an i and a string 3' e V*z.e such that 3,N~(X, Y) -> * 1, where 
Vz.e = Fz w {aj(A, B)]A and B are users, A # B, j t> 2} u {/3j(A, B)IA and B are 
users, A # B, j i> 1}. Then P is insecure. I f  this condition is not satisfied, then P is 
secure. 
Dolev and Yao proved that the question of whether a two-party name-stamp 
protocol is secure is decidable in polynomial time. Dolev, Even and Karp [3] showed 
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that this question is decidable in time O(n  3) where 
n= y I ,1+ Y It jl. 
~iEP ~jEP 
3. Main result 
In a cascade protocol, only functions in D u E are al lowed; otherwise, the 
definitions remain the same. Dolev and Yao developed an elegant characterization 
of two-party cascade protocols that are secure. Essentially, this characterization 
shows that such a protocol is secure if and only if each operator di, /3j satisfies 
certain conditions that can be checked by inspection. What will be shown here is 
that no such characterization can exist for two-party name-stamp rotocols that are 
secure. 
Definition. (a) Let P = {cTi,/~j[ 1 ~< i <~ t, 1 <~j ~< t'} be a two-party protocol. For any 
choice of two user names X and Y, the words ai(X, Y), 1 <~ i ~ t, and flj(X, Y), 
1 ~<j~< t', are primitive (X, Y)-operators of the protocol P. For each a~(X, Y), 
1 ~< i~< t, let p(a,(X, Y)) = X, and, for each flj(X, Y), 1 <~j<~ t', let p(flj(X, Y)) = Y. 
(b) Let k I> 1. A k-characterization f security is a predicate Ck of2k+ 1 arguments 
(Xo, x l , . . . ,  Xk, Y l , . . . ,  Yk) satisfying the following: for every two-party protocol 
P = {cTi,/3j[ 1 <~ i <~ t, 1 <~j <~ t'}, P is secure if and only if for every sequence 
(3/1, - . -  , "Yk) of k primitive (X, Y)-operators from {a~(X, Y), flj(X, Y)12~ < i~  < t, 1 <~ 
j<~t'}, Ck(Otl(X , r ) ,  Y l , - - - ,  Yk, P (Y l ) , . . . , P (Tk) )  is true.  
The definition of a two-party cascade protocol P is similar to that of a name-stamp 
protocol with the restriction that t~ ~ {z~, z3, z4}*, 1 <~ i ~< t, and /~j ~ {z2, z3, z4}*, 
1 ~<j ~< t'. Dolev and Yao developed a characterization of two-party cascade protocols 
that are secure. To review that characterization, some definitions must be stated. 
For any 7r ~ F* and user name X, ~r has the balancing property with respect o 
X if Dxe l t (Tr )  implies Ex~lt(Tr).  A two-party cascade protocol P= 
{~i,/~j[ 1<~ i <~ t, 1 ~<j <~ t'} is balanced if, for any two distinct user names X, Y, 
(i) for every i~2 ,  a~(X, Y) is balanced with respect o X, and 
(ii) for every j t> 1, flj(X, Y) is balanced with respect o Y. 
The characterization of secure two-party cascade protocols as given by Dolev and 
Yao is as follows: P is secure if and only if lt(a~(X, Y))c~ E ~ ~ and, for all 
i =2 , . . . ,  t, a~(X, Y) has the balancing property with respect to X and, for all 
j=  1 , . . . ,  t', flj(X, Y) has the balancing property with respect to Y. This is a 
1-characterization of security as witnessed by the predicate C~(xo, x~, y~) which is 
defined to be true if lt(xo) n E ~ 0 and (if Yl = X, then xl has the balancing property 
with respect o X)  and (if y~ = Y, then x~ has the balancing property with respect 
to Y). Thus, we have a 1-characterization of security for such protocols. 
The reader will note that there is a certain ambiguity in the definition. It is possible 
that for some protocol P there exists i and j such that a~(X, Y )= flj(X, Y). Then 
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p is multi-valued, since it is intended that p(a,(X, Y))= X and p(flj(X, Y))= Y. 
This portion of the definition can be rewritten to avoid this ambiguity, but, since 
we will use these notions only in the proof of the next theorem, we will not do so here. 
Now, we can state our main result. 
Theorem. There is no k >1 1 such that there exists a k-characterization of security for 
two-party name-stamp protocols. 
Proof. We will develop a sequence of facts about a family of protocols whose 
definition depends on the parameter n. To begin we choose n >I 2 and let P0 = 
{Ji,/3ill <-i,j<-n + 1} be the two-party name-stamp protocol specified as follows: 
Y)  " "÷"  " = 13 y ly lx ,  
3, (x ,  Y )= E"  . . . .  "÷ '  Y Iy IxayL I  y , 
ai(X, Y)=I ,  i=2 , . . . ,n+l ,  
gTn+l - - J ; ;  i /  ¢ /  I '~n+2- - j  flj(X, Y)=~_.¢ ,g,x,,x,,g,-..g , j=2 , . . . ,n ,  
fl,,+~( X, Y)= ExiyixdxdyDy. 
It is easy to see that Po is a valid two-party name-stamp protocol, that is, X can 
compute each of the ai(X, Y), Y can compute each of the flj(X, Y), and, for every 
i, Ni(X, Y)e  (E u D u I)*. Further, it is easy to see that P0 is insecure: if y = 
dxdzdgDzfl,+l(Z, Y)fl,,(Z, Y)fl,,_~(Z, Y ) . . .  fl2(Z, Y)fl~(Z, Y), then ya~(X, Y) 
"~ :g l .  
Now, we consider n + 1 different protocols that are defined from the protocol Po. 
(i) Let /31 be such that, for every two user names A, B, fl~(A,B)= 
n • • n+l  
EBIBIAdAdBDB . Let P1 = {J,,/3ill <~i<~n+ 1,2<~j<~n+ 1}u{/3~}. 
(ii) For each k e{2 , . . . ,  n}, let /~, be such that, for every two user names 
A, B, 3 (A,B) . . . . .  =I3B IBIAI3B tatAaAaaWB . Let Pk={~i, flsll<~i<.n+l, 
1 <~j ~< n + 1 with j ~ k} u {/3~}. 
(iii) Let /~'+1 be such that, for every two user names A, B, /3"÷1(A, B)= 
EBiaiAdAdaDB. Let P,+I = {~,/3jl 1 <~ i~< n+ 1, 1 ~<j~< n} u {/3"+~}. 
Consider P~. It is straightforward to show that P1 is a valid name-stamp protocol. 
Further, we claim that P~ is secure. To prove this, let H i=Fzw 
{flj(A, B)I j= 2, . . . , n+ I, A ~ B, A e {X, Y,Z}, B e {X, Y}}u{f'~(A, B)IA ~ B, Ae 
{X, Y, Z}, Be{X,  Y}}. Then it suffices to show (by induction on lyl) that, for all 
yel l1*,  It(yat(X, Y) )n J#O,  or there exist weF*,  k>~l, Ce{X,  Y} such that 
ya,(X, Y)= wE~iyix. 
Similarly, for each k, 2 <~ k <~ n, Pk is a valid two-party name-stamp protocol and 
Pk is secure. The security of Pk is shown by letting Hk = Fz u{flj(A, B ) l j¢  k, 
j e{1 , . . . ,n+l} ,  A~B,  Ae{X,Y ,Z} ,  Be{X,Y}}u{f l ' k (A ,B) IA~B , Ae 
{X, Y, Z}, B e{X, Y}} and showing that, for all y e H*, l t(yal(X, Y ) )c~J~0,  or 
there exist w e F* and u e {ix, iz}* with ya~(X, Y) = wE~,+2-kiyu. 
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Finally, it is clear that P,,+~ is a valid two-party name-stamp protocol. Further, 
P~+~ is secure. To show that P~+~ is secure, it suffices to prove that, for all y e H,+~, 
Eyelt(yal(X, Y)), where H~+I=Fzw{fl~(A,B)[j= 1 , . . . ,n ,A~ B, Ae{X, Y,Z}, 
Be{X, Y}}u{~'+~(A,B)IA~ B, Ae{X, Y,Z}, Be{X, Y}}. 
We will use the protocols Po, P~,. . . ,  P,+~ to show that there is no 'simple' 
characterization f name-stamp protocols that are secure. 
Assume to the contrary that, for some k I> 1, such a k-characterization f security 
for two-party name-stamp protocols exists. Let Ck be a predicate of 2k + 1 arguments 
that witnesses that characterization. Let n = k + 1 and consider for this value of n I> 2 
the protocols Po, P~,. - . ,  P~+~ defined above. 
As noted above, Po is insecure. Thus, there exists a k-tuple y~,..., Yk of primitive 
(X, Y)-operators of Po such that Ck(a~(X, Y), Yb... ,  "Yk, P( '~ I ) ,  • • • , P ( '~k) )  is false. 
Since n > k, there exists a j such that fit(X, Y) is not one of the primitive (X, Y)- 
operators Yl, • •., Yk in this k-tuple. 
Now consider the protocol Pj. This protocol differs from Po only by containing 
fl~(X, Y) instead offlj(X, Y). Since/3j(X, Y) does not occurin the k-tuple ya, . . . ,  '~k, 
this k-tuple is a legitimate choice when evaluating the predicate Ck for protocol Pj. 
But Ck(O~a(X, Y), Yb . - . ,  Yk, P(T~),---, P(Yk)) is false so that Pj must be insecure 
by the assumption that Ck witnesses a k-characterization f security for two-party 
name-stamp protocols. However, we have seen that, for each j/> 1, P~ is secure, a 
contradiction. [] 
Note that we are making no claims about other methods of characterizing security 
for name-stamp rotocols. Our attention has been restricted to characterizations 
involving a uniformly bounded number of primitive (X, Y) - operators and our result 
asserts that no such characterization exists. Thus, it appears that security for such 
protocols can be tested only by using algorithmic methods (as in [3]). Lower bounds 
on the complexity of the problem of determining whether a name-stamp protocol 
is secure have been studied by Pan [5]. 
The protocols studied here are 'symmetric': for every user X, ExDx ~ 1 and 
DxEx ~ 1. A protocol is 'nonsymmetric' f, for every user X, the cancellation rule 
ExDx ~ 1 is not allowed. This implies that, in a nonsymmetric protocol, ExDx is 
not congruent to 1 for any user X. The present authors [2] have studied nonsymmetric 
cascade protocols and nonsymmetric name-stamp protocols and have developed a
1-characterization f security for two-party nonsymmetric cascade protocols that 
are secure, and Pan [5] has extended those to the p-party case. It is clear that the 
proof of the result of the present note applies to two-party nonsymmetric name-stamp 
protocols and, in fact, to all p-party name-stamp protocols, symmetric or nonsym- 
metric. 
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